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Abstract
Decision making and learning in a real-world context require organisms to track not only the choices they make and the
outcomes that follow but also other untaken, or counterfactual, choices and their outcomes. Although the neural system
responsible for tracking the value of choices actually taken is increasingly well understood, whether a neural system tracks
counterfactual information is currently unclear. Using a three-alternative decision-making task, a Bayesian reinforcement-
learning algorithm, and fMRI, we investigated the coding of counterfactual choices and prediction errors in the human
brain. Rather than representing evidence favoring multiple counterfactual choices, lateral frontal polar cortex (lFPC),
dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC), and posteromedial cortex (PMC) encode the reward-based evidence favoring the best
counterfactual option at future decisions. In addition to encoding counterfactual reward expectations, the network carries a
signal for learning about counterfactual options when feedback is available—a counterfactual prediction error. Unlike other
brain regions that have been associated with the processing of counterfactual outcomes, counterfactual prediction errors
within the identified network cannot be related to regret theory. Furthermore, individual variation in counterfactual choice-
related activity and prediction error-related activity, respectively, predicts variation in the propensity to switch to profitable
choices in the future and the ability to learn from hypothetical feedback. Taken together, these data provide both neural
and behavioral evidence to support the existence of a previously unidentified neural system responsible for tracking both
counterfactual choice options and their outcomes.
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Introduction
It is widely agreed that a network of brain areas centered on
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and including anterior
and posterior cingulate cortex encodes the values of choices that
are taken [1–3]. Such a representation is assumed to be important
for two functions. First, a representation of choice value is needed
for decision making [1]. Second, a representation of a choice’s
value is needed for comparison with the subsequently experienced
outcome [4,5]. The discrepancy between the two, called the
prediction error, is thought to be fundamental for learning because
it partly determines the degree to which future reward expecta-
tions for the choice should be revised [6,7].
While it is essential for organisms to represent the value of the
choices that they take, there may also be considerable adaptive
advantages associated with representing the reward potential of
choices that are untaken. We refer to such potential, but untaken,
choices as counterfactual choices. Such representations may confer
both decision-making and learning advantages. First, if the reward
potential of such choices is maintained neurally, then the organism
may be better able to choose them in the future when it is beneficial,
even in the absence of learning. Second, such a representation
would make it possible to learn valuable information about what
would have ensued had another choice been taken without having
to incur both the energetic and opportunity costs that making the
choice would have entailed. These representations would therefore
enable us to exploit valuable, otherwise discarded, information and
in turn make superior decisions in complex environments ranging
from foraging in the wild to investing in financial markets. Unlike
regret-related influences on behavior, which can lead to suboptimal
biases in decision making, learning from counterfactual prediction
errors should lead to more optimal decision making.
There is preliminary evidence that the lateral frontal polar
cortex (lFPC) may contribute to such a decision-making repre-
sentation during binary choice; lFPC activity increases with the
potential future reward associated with the unchosen option [8].
Organisms, however, are frequently confronted with choices be-
tween multiple uncertain prospects, and whether and how lFPC
activity might guide decision making in such situations is un-
known. When a decision-making problem is no longer binary,
several potential schemes for coding unchosen options emerge.
First, lFPC may represent the potential future reward of both
unchosen options (Figure 1A). There may, however, be limits to
the number of potential alternative courses of action that can be
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lFPC codes for the opportunity cost of the chosen option—that is,
the value of the best of the unchosen options—and discards the
worst option (Figure 1B). However, a third coding scheme is also
possible; the FPC may weigh up the best unchosen option relative to
the other options—in other words, relative to both the chosen
option and the other unchosen option (Figure 1C). Such a system
would be indicative of a mechanism for evaluating the merit of
choosing the best pending option at forthcoming decisions rather
than a system for evaluating whether it is beneficial to choose
either pending option in the future. Such a coding scheme might
allow for very efficient transitions in behavior in a changing
environment, but as we explain below, it predicts more effective
switching to some options than others.
There has been considerable recent interest in the possibility
that the brain encodes fictive information [11,12]. Specifically, it
has been shown that activity in the dorsal striatum and parietal
cortex is sensitive to the difference between the best possible out-
come that could have been attained and the experiential outcome
over gains but not losses [9]. Furthermore, single neurons in
monkey dorsal anterior cingulate cortex are sensitive to the size of
untaken outcomes [12]. It remains unclear, however, whether the
brain encodes prediction errors for counterfactual choices—the
discrepancy between the outcome for an untaken choice and the
reward expectation associated with making that choice—in a
separate and parallel manner to experiential prediction errors.
This is necessarily difficult to establish in any paradigm in which
there is a systematic relationship between the outcomes of counter-
factual and experiential choices [11,12].
To tackle these and related issues, we conducted an FMRI
experiment in which human subjects made voluntary decisions
between three options with independent reward probabilities,
followed on most trials by decisions between the remaining two
options that were unchosen during the first decision. Choices were
made on the basis of two pieces of information: the probability of
reward associated with each stimulus (which the participant had to
estimate from recent outcomes of both chosen and unchosen
options) and the reward magnitude associated with each stimulus
(which was displayed on the screen beneath each stimulus and
changed unpredictably from trial-to-trial). A Bayesian model was
used to infer the reward outcome probabilities [13]. These
manipulations enabled us to dissociate the relevant variables
guiding immediate decisions (the three option expected values) from
those guiding future decisions (the three option reward probabilities)
and to test for the independent representation of counterfactual
prediction errors during learning. Here we show that the lFPC,
Figure 1. Theoretical LFPC coding schemes. Three hypothetical
coding schemes for the LFPC are presented based on the findings of
Boorman et al. (2009) [8]. (A) According to one possible scheme, there is
a positive correlation with reward probabilities of both of the unchosen
options and a negative correlation with the reward probability of the
chosen option. This scheme might be expected if the LFPC encodes the
average of the two unchosen options relative to the chosen option. (B)
In the second hypothetical system, there is a positive correlation with
the reward probability of the best unchosen option and a negative
correlation with the reward probability of the chosen option, while the
worst option is discarded altogether. This would be consistent with a
system encoding the opportunity cost of the decision. (C) In the third
scheme presented, the reward probability of the best unchosen option
is encoded positively, while the reward probability of both of the
alternatives—the chosen and worst unchosen options—are encoded
negatively. This system would be useful for appraising the worthiness of
switching to the best pending option. Pch, chosen reward probability;




Reinforcement learning (RL) models, which formally
describe how we learn from direct experience, can explain
a diverse array of animal behavior. Considering alternative
outcomes that could have been obtained but were not
falls outside the purview of traditional RL models.
However, such counterfactual thinking can considerably
accelerate learning in real-world contexts, ranging from
foraging in the wild to investing in financial markets. In this
study, we show that three brain regions in humans
(frontopolar, dorsomedial frontal, and posteromedial
cortex) play a special role in tracking ‘‘what might have
been’’, and whether it is worth choosing such foregone
options in the future. These regions encode the net benefit
of choosing the next-best alternative in the future,
suggesting that the next-best alternative may be privi-
leged over inferior alternatives in the human brain. When
people subsequently witness feedback indicating what
would have happened had they made a different choice,
these same regions encode a key learning signal—a
prediction error that signals the discrepancy between
what would have happened and what people believed
could have happened. Further analysis indicates these
brain regions exploit counterfactual information to guide
future changes in behavior. Such functions may be
compromised in addiction and psychiatric conditions
characterized by an inability to alter maladaptive behavior.
Counterfactual Choice and Learning in FPC
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learning about counterfactual options.
Results
Experimental Design
Participants performed a decision-making task in which they
repeatedly chose between a face, house, and body stimulus that
were presented at one of three locations at random (Figure 2A).
On each trial random integers between 1 and 100 were displayed
beneath the stimuli that indicated the size of potential reward
associated with selecting that option. Participants were informed
that since these reward magnitudes were generated randomly on
each trial, it was not advantageous to track them across trials.
However, participants were not directly cued about the probability
with which each option would be rewarded if chosen. Instead,
participants were told that these reward probabilities depended
only on the recent outcome history. To produce a changeable
environment, these reward probabilities varied from trial to trial
according to a fixed volatility [13] during the course of the experi-
ment. On two-thirds of trials (conditions 2 and 3), participants
encountered a second decision between the two options that were
foregone at the first decision, a manipulation that enabled more
accurate estimates of participants’ own ranking of the two unchosen
options. Following the second decision, feedback on chosen and
counterfactual options was presented, thereby allowing us to search
for neural correlates of counterfactual prediction errors. On the
other third of trials (condition 1), there was no second decision;
instead feedback on the two unselected options was presented
(Figure 2A).
An optimal Bayesian learner [13] was used to model participant
estimates of the probabilities of reward associated with the options
given the history of recent choice outcomes (i.e., rewarded or
unrewarded chosen and unchosen options) (Figure 2B). The
Bayesian learner enabled us to select a reward schedule that de-
correlated the reward probabilities associated with each option.
In the selected reward schedule, there was limited correlation
between the reward probability associated with the three options
(mean r across participants between body part and face
stimuli=2.4; body part and house stimuli=0.01; face and house
stimuli=2.4) and between the expected value (reward probabil-
ity6reward magnitude) associated with the three options (mean r
between body part and face stimuli=2.2; body part and house
stimuli=0.03; face and house stimuli=20.14). Although we could
not know what choices our participants would ultimately make,
this increased the likelihood that chosen and unchosen reward
probabilities or expected values would also be de-correlated. As
anticipated, there was indeed limited correlation between chosen
and unchosen option reward probabilities (mean r for chosen and
best unchosen ,2.1; chosen and worst unchosen=2.2; best
unchosen and worst unchosen=.37). Similarly, there was little
correlation between the chosen and unchosen option values (mean
r for chosen and best unchosen ,.1; chosen and worst unchosen
,.1; best unchosen and worst unchosen=.43) (Figure 3A). It is
important to note that the random trial-by-trial fluctuations in
reward magnitude meant that only option probabilities had to be
maintained for making future choices. This feature of the experi-
mental design also meant that it was optimal to learn about option
reward probabilities but not reward magnitudes.
Choice Behavior
Before searching for evidence of a neural representation of un-
chosen options, it is important to assess whether there is behavioral
evidence that people not only update their future reward
expectations experientially, from the feedback provided for the
chosen option, but also counterfactually, from the feedback
provided for unchosen options. Similarly, it is important to establish
whether or not there is evidence that behavior is influenced by the
values of the different possible options that might be taken.
To assess the fit to behavior of the optimal Bayesian model,
which used both experiential and counterfactual feedback to
update estimates of options’ reward probabilities, we computed the
log likelihood and Bayesian Information Criterion and compared
the fit to two alternative models (Table 1; Figure S4). To test
whether people learn from counterfactual feedback, we compared
the fit of the optimal Bayesian model to the fit of an alternative
model that we term an ‘‘experiential Bayesian model’’ because it is
identical to the optimal model except that it does not update
unchosen options. As can be seen from Table 1, the optimal
Bayesian model clearly outperformed the experiential Bayesian
model, implying that people learned from both experienced and
counterfactual feedback. Finally, we also compared the optimal
model with a conventional Rescorla Wagner model that updates
both chosen and unchosen options. The optimal model was also a
far better fit to behavior than the Rescorla Wagner model that
updates both chosen and unchosen options (Table 1; Text S1). It is
notable that these Bayesian models have some parallels with
learning models used previously to analyze behavior during
experimental games [14].
To further assess whether the optimal Bayesian model captured
choice behavior, as well as which variables influenced participant
choices, we performed logistic regression analyses. This analy-
sis aimed to determine the degree to which choosing the most
valuable option was influenced by the outcome probabilities as
estimated by the optimal Bayesian model and reward magnitudes
associated with the best, mid, and worst options (see Text S1 for
details). This analysis revealed a strong positive effect of the best
option (reward probability: t(18)=7.56, p,0.0001; reward mag-
nitude: t(18)=5.45, p,0.0001), a strong negative effect of the mid
option (reward probability: t(18)=28.50, p,0.0001; reward
magnitude: t(18)=24.86, p,0.0001), and a modest but highly
consistent effect of the worst option (reward probability: t(18)=
22.27, p=0.02; reward magnitude: t(18)=25.16, p,0.0001) on
choices of the best option (i.e., optimal choices) (Figure 3B). In
other words, the reward probabilities estimated by the optimal
Bayesian model and the explicitly presented reward magnitudes
were both strong predictors of participants’ choices. Consistent
with the experimental design, the reward magnitude from the
previous trial by contrast did not have any impact on current
choices of the best option (best reward magnitude trial i-1:
t(18)=0.49, p=0.31; mid reward magnitude trial i-1: t(18)=0.67,
p=0.25; worst reward magnitude trial i-1: t(18)=0.59, p=0.28).
Thus, optimal estimates of reward probability and current but not
past reward magnitudes strongly influenced participant behavior
(see Text S1 for more details). The analyses described above indi-
cate that although the best and mid options principally drive
choice, the worst option also consistently explains a small amount
of variance in participant choices of the best option.
Whether people learn differently from experiential and counter-
factual feedback remains an open question. To address this we
constructed an additional model in which separate learning rates
scaled chosen and unchosen prediction errors (Text S1). These two
participant-specific learning rates were fitted to each participant’s
choices using standard estimation procedures. In our experimental
task, there was no difference between the learning rates for chosen
and unchosen feedback (t(18),.25, p.0.4), suggesting that people
may not learn differently from counterfactual feedback and
Counterfactual Choice and Learning in FPC
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body, and house stimulus, whose locations on the screen were randomized across trials. Participants were required to combine two pieces of
information: the reward magnitude associated with each choice (which was shown in yellow beneath each stimulus) and the reward probability
associated with each stimulus (which was not shown but could be estimated from the recent outcome history). When the yellow question mark
appeared in the center of the screen, participants could indicate their choices by making right-hand button responses that corresponded to the
location of the stimulus. The selected option was then highlighted by a red frame and the outcome was presented in the center of the screen: a
green tick or a red X indicating a rewarded or unrewarded choice, respectively. If the choice was rewarded, the red points bar at the bottom of the
screen updated towards the gold rectangular target in proportion to the number of points won. Each time the bar reached the target, participants
were rewarded with £2. One of three conditions followed in pseudorandom order. In condition 1 the outcomes (rewarded or unrewarded) of the two
unselected options were presented to the left of each stimulus, followed by the next trial. The points bar did not move in this condition. In conditions
2 and 3 participants had the opportunity to choose between the two options they had foregone at the first decision. In condition 2 the points
associated with each stimulus remained the same as at the first decision. In condition 3 the points both changed to 50. In both conditions 2 and 3,
when the yellow question mark appeared for the second time, participants indicated their second choices. This was followed immediately by
feedback for both the chosen option, which once again was highlighted by a red frame, and the unchosen option, to the left of each stimulus. If the
chosen option at the second decision was rewarded, the red points bar also moved towards the target in proportion to the number of points won.
This second feedback phase was followed by presentation of the next trial. (B) The probability of reward associated with the face, body, and house
stimuli as estimated by an optimal Bayesian learner (Experimental Procedures) are plotted over trials in cyan, magenta, and purple respectively. The
underlying reward probabilities varied from trial-to-trial according to a fixed volatility. The reward probabilities associated with each option were
Counterfactual Choice and Learning in FPC
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available and equally informative.
The Reward-Based Evidence Favoring Future Switches to
the Best Pending Option
In order to search for evidence of neural activity encoding the
reward association of the best unchosen option, we first tested for
voxels across the whole brain where activity correlated with the
reward probability of the best unchosen option—one of the
relevant metrics to track across trials to inform future switches. We
also included the reward probability of the chosen and worse
unchosen options as separate terms in the general linear model
(Table S1). This analysis revealed three regions with a positive
effect of the reward probability of the best unchosen option
(Z.3.1, p,0.001 uncorrected; cluster extent .10 voxels): left
lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC; Z=3.50, MNI x=236, y=58,
de-correlated (Results; Figure 3A). (C) The expected value (reward probability6reward magnitude) associated with face, body, and house stimuli are
plotted across trials in turquoise, light pink, and light purple, respectively. Reward magnitudes were selected so that the correlation between
expected values was also limited.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001093.g002
Figure 3. Cross-correlation matrix and behavioral regression coefficients. (A) Group cross-correlation matrix depicting mean correlation (r)
across participants between reward probabilities, expected values, and reward magnitudes of chosen, next best, and worst options. (B) Mean
regression coefficients (i.e., parameter estimates) related to the reward probabilities (left column) and reward magnitudes (right column) of the
options with the highest, middle, and lowest expected value derived from a logistic regression on optimal choices (i.e., choices of the option with the
highest expected value). Error bars represent standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001093.g003
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(PMC; Z=3.70, x=2, y=262, z=38), and dorsomedial frontal
cortex (DMFC; Z=3.33, x=6, y=34, z=42) (Figure 4A; Table
S2). Although no activations exceeded the threshold in right lFPC,
an activation emerged at the reduced threshold of p,0.003,
uncorrected (see Figure 4A). It is important to note that we have
deliberately refrained from using the most sensitive regressor in
this analysis because the purpose was to define ROIs that will be
unbiased for later tests. When the best unchosen probability relative
to the chosen probability is instead used as the regressor, there is a
more robust effect in the lFPC (Figure S1; Z=3.99, MNI x=236,
58, 26), as expected based on a previous demonstration that the
lFPC encodes a relative signal in a binary choice task [8].
To test whether and how the lFPC, PMC, and DMFC might
also encode alternative options, we performed orthogonal analyses
on the time courses of these regions identified by the whole-brain
analysis. In addition to a positive correlation with the best un-
chosen reward probability, the lFPC signal correlated negatively
with the reward probability for both the chosen (t(18)=23.46,
p,0.005) and other unchosen option (t(18)=22.21, p,0.03)
during the decision-making phase (Figure 4B). The lFPC signal
correlates positively with the reward potential of the best alter-
native and negatively with the reward potential of both the chosen
option and the worse unchosen option, suggesting that lFPC
forecasts the evidence in favor of choosing the better of the two
unchosen options at future choices. Such an activity pattern is
inconsistent with FPC simply maintaining a representation of the
advantage to be gained from switching to any alternative action. It
would, however, be predicted if lFPC represented only one
alterative action in a pending state. Under such a scheme, the
negative encoding of the reward probability of both the chosen
option and the worse unchosen option can be interpreted as
reflecting the potential opportunity cost of foregoing the chosen
action or the other alternative action if there were to be a switch in
behavior to the pending state.
We also identified evidence for a very similar pattern of activity
in PMC and a closely related one in DMFC. In PMC there was a
significant negative correlation with the chosen option
(t(18)=22.23, p,0.02) and the other unchosen option during
the decision-making phase (t(18)=22.0, p,0.03), whereas in
DMFC, there was a significant negative correlation with the
chosen option (t(18)=21.9, p,0.04), but the effect of the worse
unchosen option was not significant (t(18)=21.24, p.0.11) during
the decision-making phase.
We repeated these analyses on only those trials on which a
single decision had to be made in order to exclude the possibility
that activity related to a second decision could confound activity
related to the feedback phase of a first decision. Because of the
short temporal interval between the first feedback phase and the
second decision-making phase in our experiment on some trials,
activity related to late time points during the first feedback period
is difficult to dissociate from activity related to the second decision
in these time course analyses. When there is a second decision the
effect of the worst unchosen option flips from being encoded
negatively to positively when it frequently becomes the best (and
only) unchosen option at the second decision-making period. To
circumvent such issues, we reexamined the time course during
condition 1 in which there was not a second decision that could
interfere with the lFPC response to the first decision and feed-
back phases. Although the number of trials in this analysis is
substantially reduced, there were still significant negative effects of
the chosen probability (t(18)=22.93, p,0.005) and worst
unchosen probability (t(18)=22.62, p,0.01) (Figure 5A) in lFPC.
Similarly, the PMC signal was significantly and negatively
correlated with the chosen reward probability (t(18)=22.17,
p,0.03) and worst unchosen reward probability (t(18)=22.06,
p,0.03). However, in DMFC there was still only a significant
Figure 4. The reward-based evidence favoring future choices
of the best pending option. (A) Axial and sagittal slices through z-
statistic maps relating to the effect of reward probability of the
unchosen option with the highest reward probability. Maps are
thresholded at z.2.8, p,0.003 for display purposes, and are displayed
according to radiological convention. (B) Time course of the effects of
the reward probability for the chosen option (blue), the unchosen
option with the highest reward probability (red), and the unchosen
option with the lowest reward probability (green) are shown across the
first decision-making and feedback phases. Time courses are not
corrected for the hemodynamic lag. Thick lines: mean effect size.
Shadows: 6 s.e.m. Top row: LFPC; middle row: PMC; bottom row: DMFC.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001093.g004
Table 1. Comparison of model fits for the optimal Bayesian,
experiential Bayesian, and Rescorlar Wagner models.
Model Parameters Log Likelihood BIC
Optimal Bayesian 3 (0 predictor) 22,080 4,175.6
Experiential Bayesian 3 (0 predictor) 22,265.8 4,547.1
Rescorla Wagner 4 (1 predictor) 22,634.2 5,289.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001093.t001
Counterfactual Choice and Learning in FPC
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p,0.02; worst unchosen option: t(18)=20.98, p.0.17).
The interpretation that this signal reflects the future evidence in
favor of choosing the best unchosen option at subsequent decisions
makes a testable prediction about behavior. Participants in whom
this evidence is better represented should go on to choose the best
pending option more frequently. It is important to note that during
the initial decision, it is the unchosen option with the highest
reward probability that is likely to be the best option at second
decisions. In accord with the hypothesis, the greater the effect of
the best unchosen probability relative to the worst unchosen
probability in the lFPC across participants in conditions 2 and 3
(i.e., when there was a second decision), the more frequently
participants chose the pending option that was associated with the
highest reward probability at second decisions (Figure 5C).
The identified lFPC coding scheme further suggests that people
may be better at adapting behavior to the next best alternative
than to the worse alternative when confronted with decisions
between multiple options. Such a scheme makes an intriguing
prediction about behavior. It is possible that people switch
choices to the next best alternative more effectively than they do
to the worse alternative. This prediction is testable in our task
because the previously worst option might become the best
option when random reward magnitudes are introduced at the
onset of a new trial. Consistent with this proposition, we found
that participants adapted choices to the best pending option when
it was optimal significantly more frequently than they did to the
worse pending option when it was optimal, even when the
analysis was restricted to trials matched for value difference
(t(18)=2.17, p=0.02).
Counterfactual Prediction Errors
A valuable source of information during learning comes not
only from the experienced outcomes of actions that are taken but
also from the consequences of alternative potential actions that
might be taken in the future. It was hypothesized that brain re-
gions that encode future reward expectations related to unchosen
options might also be involved in updating those expectations.
This prediction is based upon recent evidence demonstrating that
prediction error-like signals can be identified in brain regions
thought to be specialized for visual and social processing when
participants must their expectations during visual and social
learning, respectively [15–22]. We reasoned that the same prin-
ciple might hold true for learning about unchosen options.
Analysis of the time course of the lFPC, DMFC, and PMC
regions identified by the whole-brain analysis revealed a significant
correlation with the unchosen, but not chosen, prediction error
following the delivery of feedback for the second decision in each
region (unchosen prediction error: lFPC: t(18)=2.01, p,0.05;
DMFC: t(18)=2.8, p,0.01; PMC: t(18)=4.35, p,0.0005; chosen
prediction error: lFPC: t(18)=.39, p.0.3; DMFC: t(18)=.29,
p.0.35; PMC: t(18)=20.11, p.0.45). Moreover, the pattern of
activity in these regions elicited by counterfactual rewards
(Figure 6) was similar to that displayed by dopaminergic neurons
for experienced rewards [23]. Activity correlated positively with
the probability of reward for the unchosen option before the
outcome was revealed (lFPC: t(18)=1.89, p,0.05; DMFC:
t(18)=3.55, p,0.005; PMC: t(18)=2.06, p,0.05). Following the
delivery of feedback, activity correlated negatively with this same
probability (lFPC: t(18)=21.78, p,0.05; DMFC: t(18)=21.92,
p,0.05; PMC: t(18)=21.90, p,0.05) and positively with the
unchosen outcome (lFPC: t(18)=1.81, p,0.05; DMFC: t(18)=
2.65, p,0.01; PMC: t(18)=4.31, p,0.0005). These regions’
activity therefore reflected both components of the counterfactual
prediction error—the counterfactual outcome minus the expecta-
tion (Figure 6). Replicating previous findings, we identified experien-
tial reward prediction errors in the ventral striatum, among other
regions (Figure S2; Table S2).
We further considered the possibility that neural counterfactual
prediction error signals might have an impact on behavior. We
Figure 5. LFPC effect predicts individual differences in
behavior. (A) Time course is plotted on the subset of trials during
which there was no second decision across the entire trial. (B) Time
course of LFPC effects of the best minus the worst unchosen probability
(red) and the chosen probability (blue) in condition 1 are shown plotted
across the trial. Conventions are the same as in Figure 4. (C) Between-
subject correlation is plotted across the trial. The curve depicts the
correlation (r) between the effect of the best minus the worst unchosen
probability in the LFPC from conditions 2 and 3 (i.e., when there was a
second decision) and the proportion of trials on which participants
chose the option with the highest reward probability at the second
decision. Inset: scatterplot of the effect size against the behavioral index
at the time of the first peak in the effect of the best relative to the worst
unchosen probability from condition 1 shown in (B). The time point
selected for the scatterplot is thus unbiased with respect to the data
used for the between-subject analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001093.g005
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terfactual prediction errors may learn more effectively from
counterfactual feedback. To test this hypothesis, we compared the
model fit to behavior of the optimal Bayesian model that updates
both chosen and unchosen options and the experiential Bayesian
model that only updates the chosen option. The difference in the
fit to behavior of these models provided an index of the extent to
which people learned from counterfactual feedback. Across the
sample of participants, there was a tight relationship between the
effect size for the counterfactual prediction error and the dif-
ference between the fits of the optimal and experiential models in
the PMC (r=0.64, p,0.005; Figure 6). There was a similar
tendency in lFPC, though this did not reach statistical significance
(lFPC: r=0.39, p=0.10), but not in DMFC (r=.24, p.0.3).
Regret should theoretically grow as the difference between the
reward magnitude of the foregone outcome and the chosen out-
come increases, independently of the reward expectation [24,25].
Unlike regret-related FMRI signals that have been identified
previously [11,25], activity in the lFPC, DMFC, and PMC was
not sensitive to the difference between the size of the outcomes for
the unselected and the selected options (lFPC: t(18)=20.44, p.0.3;
DMFC: t(18)=20.86, p.0.2; PMC: t(18)=20.59, p.0.25). Taken
together, these findings demonstrate that counterfactual prediction
errors are dissociable from regret in the lFPC, DMFC, and PMC.
Discussion
A number of brain regions have been implicated in the repre-
sentation of value during learning and decision making [17,26],
but in general the focus has been on the choices that participants
make and the rewards they experience. Within the frontal cortex,
the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortical regions have most
often been the focus of such research. Here, however, we show
that the lPFC maintains a representation of the net profit to be
expected from choosing the next best alternative in the future. The
lFPC BOLD signal increases as the probability of obtaining
reward from the next best alternative increases. The reward that
might be sacrificed by switching away from the current action may
be represented as a cost of switching to the alternative; lFPC
BOLD activity decreases as the probability of reward associated
with the current course of action increases. Similarly, the reward
that might be lost by foregoing the worst unchosen option can be
conceived of as a cost; lFPC BOLD decreases as the probability of
reward associated with the worst foregone option increases. When
there are multiple alternatives to choose between, the pattern of
lFPC activity is therefore consistent with a system that forecasts the
reward potential of the best alternative option and the costs of not
taking both the current course of action and the other alternative.
This coding scheme is consistent with a system that accumulates
evidence in favor of choosing the best pending option in the future
so that it can be switched to effectively.
There were several plausible schemes according to which the
lFPC could represent unchosen alternatives. The data presented
hereprovideevidenceinfavorofthesystemdepictedinFigure1C—
namely that the lFPC encodes the merit of potential future switches
to the next best alternative. This interpretation is supported by a
between-subject correlation between the effect of the reward
probability associated with the best relative to the worst unchosen
Figure 6. Counterfactual prediction errors. The time course of the
fictive prediction error is plotted decomposed into its component parts:
the expectation of reward for the unchosen option (pink) and the
outcome of the unchosen option (cyan). The time course is plotted
from the onset of the initial feedback for the first decision. There is a
positive effect of the fictive outcome and a negative effect of the fictive
expectation after the revelation of the outcome in each region.
Conventions are the same as in Figure 4. Bottom row inset plots the
counterfactual prediction error effect size in the PMC against the
difference between the fit to behavior of the optimal and experiential
Bayesian models, where each point represents a single subject.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001093.g006
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supported by the finding that participants are superior at adapting
behavior to the next best alternative than to the worse alternative
when these choices are optimal. The lFPC signal, as in a previous
study [8], contained peaks during both the decision-making and
feedback phases (see Figure 4A). This time course is consistent with
the notion that the lFPC tracks the relevant decision variable across
time for forthcoming choices.
Several accounts propose that the FPC maintains information
across time for future deployment [9,27–31]. FPC activity has
been shown to increase when an intention or a task set has to be
maintained during a delay and then implemented [28–30,32,33],
while damage to left anterior prefrontal cortex, including left FPC,
disrupts effective switching between task sets in such paradigms
[34]. It was recently shown that monkey FPC encodes the decision
(left or right response) over an extended delay around the time of
feedback, particularly when it was advantageous to maintain this
information for use on the next trial [35]. Furthermore, FPC is
selectively recruited when participants must maintain information
in working memory whilst performing a subtask for the purpose of
using the pending information upon completion of the subtask
[27], particularly when the time at which the pending information
must be used is unpredictable [36]. On the basis of such findings,
it has been posited that FPC has a special role in cognitive
branching—the maintenance of pending information related to a
previous behavioral episode during an ongoing behavioral epi-
sode for future use [9,37]. Following this framework, in our
experiment the current decision could be conceived of as the
ongoing behavioral episode, and the best unchosen option as the
pending information, which may be selected in the future. While
our findings are consonant with such accounts, we have shown
that the FPC not only represents pending information or inten-
tions for future use, but that it encodes the evidence in favor of their
future deployment. Moreover, we have demonstrated that when
people are confronted with more than two alternatives, the FPC
specifically encodes the evidence in favor of the unchosen alter-
native that would be most advantageous to be selected in the
future, a finding consistent with the view that there may be limits
to FPC coding during decision making [9].
In our experimental setup, participants should have expected to
encounter a second decision on approximately two-thirds of trials.
Despite this manipulation we found no evidence that this know-
ledge influenced participants’ initial decisions (see Text S1, Experi-
mental Procedures). It is nevertheless possible that participants
anticipated having to make a second decision at which point
reward magnitudes would either remain the same as they were or
equate to 50. In a previous investigation in which participants
made binary choices with no intervening second decision, the
lFPC was shown to encode the unchosen option positively and the
chosen option negatively, consistent with the positive coding of the
next best alternative and negative coding of the chosen option we
have revealed here in a multi-option context. It would be inter-
esting to examine the coding of lFPC when people make decisions
between multiple alternatives in the absence of any requirement to
make decisions between the remaining unchosen options.
lFPC appears to be only one component of a network of areas
that are interconnected and whose activity tracks the advantage to
be gained from switching to the next best alternative. The activa-
tion in PMC may be in area 31 of the posterior cingulate cortex
[38,39], while the DMFC activation appears to be situated between
the pre-SMA and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Antero-
grade and retrograde studies have examined the anatomical con-
nections between these regions in monkeys. Area 31 of the monkey
has reciprocal connections with both FPC and parts of DMFC [38],
and FPC also projects to parts of DMFC [40]. A recent study in
macaque monkeys has identified neurons in a neighboring region of
the PMC that are selective for exploration and switching between
four different response alternatives [41]. Moreover, the pre-SMA
has been implicated in switching between task sets [42]. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the lFPC, PMC, and DMFC
regions might form part of an interconnected network dedicated to
tracking the evidence in favor of future switches to the best pending
option and, in collaboration with the mid-IPS, implementing such
switches [8,43]. It is notable that the three components of the
counterfactual choice circuit are some distance from foci in ventral
DMFC, ventral PMC, and VMPFC in which the BOLD signal is
correlated with the value of the action that is chosen [1,3,8,44–47].
Reinforcement-learning models theorize that agents should
learn from both chosen and unchosen outcomes [6]. Nevertheless,
to our knowledge prediction error signals related to unchosen options
have yet to be identified in the mammalian brain. Lohrenz and
colleagues [9] have reported activity in the dorsal striatum and
posterior parietal cortex that they refer to as a fictive error signal.
Although this metric influences behavior in interesting ways [11,
48], it is distinct from the one that we report here because it
correlates with the best possible outcome that could have been
attained minus the experienced outcome received, over gains but
not losses. Crucially such fictive signals pertain to the choice of a
different level of the taken action. They do not contain infor-
mation about alternative actions with independent probabilities of
success. By contrast, a counterfactual prediction error—the counter-
factual outcome minus its expectation—should theoretically be pro-
portional to the degree to which future reward expectations of
unchosen options are updated. We found that the lFPC, DMFC,
and PMC—regions whose activity is sensitive to the unchosen
option with the highest reward probability during initial decisions—
encoded counterfactual prediction errors when participants wit-
nessed counterfactual outcomes of subsequent decisions.
A prediction error should theoretically signal the prediction of
an event before its revelation and, following its revelation, the
discrepancy between the event’s occurrence (or non-occurrence)
and the prediction—a prediction error [6]. It has been well docu-
mented, in the context of experienced rewards, that both signals
are closely approximated by the firing rate of phasically active
dopamine neurons [23]. The pattern of activity in lFPC, DMFC,
and PMC similarly exhibited both of these components but in
relation to counterfactual rewards: before the outcome was revealed
there was a positive correlation with the expectation of reward for
the unchosen option; once the outcome was witnessed, there was a
negative correlation with this same expectation and a positive
correlation with theoutcome (rewardorno rewardforthe unchosen
option). Notably, in our experimental setup unchosen reward pro-
babilities were relevant for future predictions, but unchosen reward
magnitudes were of no relevance because they changed randomly
from trial to trial. Counterfactual prediction error coding in lFPC,
DMFC, and PMC thus reflected the relevant information for
learning about unchosen options in our task—reward probabilities.
Consistent with the claim that lFPC, DMFC, and PMC encode
counterfactualpredictionerrors, butnot regret[25],activityinthese
regions was not sensitive to the difference between the reward
magnitudes of obtained and unobtained outcomes. These data
therefore constitute the first neural dissociation of counterfactual
prediction errors from regret. Intriguingly, neurons that encode
counterfactual rewards have recently been identified in the monkey
dACC [12], which neighbors and is interconnected withthe DMFC
region identified here [39,49] and is also interconnected with the
PMC and FPC [38,40]. These observations raise the possibility that
unchosen reward signals in dACC might be integrated with
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in lFPC, DMFC, and PMC.
We also tested whether there exists a relationship between the
neural coding of counterfactual prediction errors and the pro-
pensity to learn from counterfactual information. In the PMC there
was a strong relationship between the effect of counterfactual
prediction errors and how effectively participants learned from
counterfactual outcomes. This findingsuggests that neuralcoding of
counterfactual information in PMC influences counterfactual
learning behavior.
In neuroscience, there is an emerging view that predictive
coding extends beyond the domain of experienced reward [18,
50,51]. In the perceptual domain, unsigned prediction error (or
surprise) responses have been identified in inferior temporal gyrus
(ITG) when participants observe gabor patches whose orientation
does not match the orientation of a template during A, not A
decisions [18]. When the stimuli are faces or houses, rather than
gabor patches, fusiform face area (FFA) and parahippocampal
place area (PPA) are sensitive to unsigned prediction errors related
to predictions concerning faces and houses, respectively [19,22], a
modulation that at least partly contributes to the phenomenon of
repetition suppression in the FFA [19]. During incidental audio-
visual learning, the BOLD response in primary visual cortex and
putamen was shown to correlate with unsigned prediction errors,
when the appearance (or absence) of a black and white shape
stimulus was unpredicted (or predicted) by an auditory tone [20].
In the social domain, two recent investigations [15,21] have
revealed signed prediction error responses in the superior temporal
sulcus (STS) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC)—brain
regions implicated in theory of mind tasks [52,53]—when parti-
cipants have to learn about the behavior of another individual.
Prediction errors in these regions have been discovered when the
objective was to learn about the reputation of a social partner [15],
or when it was to learn about the influence of an opponent’s choice
on the likely future behavior of the opponent [21]. Collectively,
these investigations in the perceptual and social domains carry
fundamental implications: First, they suggest that prediction error
coding is more ubiquitous than previously thought and, second,
that brain regions specialized for a given class of information may
also encode prediction errors specifically related to that class of
information. The present finding that regions which encode infor-
mation related to unchosen options also encode unchosen pre-
diction errors adds counterfactual information to the classes of
information for which prediction error signals have been identified.
In summary, we have delineated the functional contribution of a
network centered on lFPC, DMFC, and PMC when human
subjects decide between multiple alternatives. The results indicate
that this network both forecasts reward expectations related to
selecting untaken alternatives in the future and also updates those
expectations—key computations for deciding and learning when
to take the road less traveled.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-two healthy volunteers participated in the fMRI experi-
ment. Two volunteers failed to use either the reward probabilities
or reward magnitudes in the task, as indicated by values of nearly
0 for each of the free parameters in the behavioral model, and one
volunteer failed to use reward probability, as indicated by values of
0 for both b and c in the behavioral model (see Behavioral Model
description below). These participants’ data were therefore dis-
carded from all analyses. The remaining 19 participants (10
women) were included in all further analyses. All participants gave
informed consent in accordance with the National Health Service
Oxfordshire Central Office for Research Ethics Committees (07/
Q1603/11).
Experimental Task
In our fMRI paradigm, participants decided repeatedly between
three stimuli based on their expectation of reward and the num-
ber of points associated with each stimulus option (Figure 2A).
Although the number of points was generated randomly and
displayed on the screen, the expectation of reward had to be
estimated from the recent outcome history. The three stimuli were
pictures of a real face, whole body, and house. The identities of the
face, body, and house were fixed for the duration of the experi-
ment and across participants. During the first decision-making
phase, the three options and their associated points were displayed
at three locations on the screen: left, upper middle, and right. The
location at which each stimulus was displayed was randomized
across trials. When the yellow question mark appeared in the
centre of the screen, participants indicated their choices with right-
hand finger responses on a button box corresponding to the
location of each stimulus. Immediately after participants indicated
their choice, the first feedback phase was presented: the selected
option was highlighted by a red rectangle that framed the chosen
stimulus and the chosen outcome (reward or no reward) was
presented. If the participant’s choice was rewarded, a green tick
appeared in the centre of the screen, and the red prize bar also
updated toward the gold rectangular target in proportion to the
amount of points won on that trial. Each time the prize bar
reached the gold target, participants were rewarded with £2. If the
participant’s choice was not rewarded, a red X appeared in the
centre of the screen, and the red prize bar remained stationary.
These initial decision-making and chosen feedback phases were
presented on every trial in the experiment.
After presentation of the chosen feedback, one of three different
conditions followed in pseudorandom order. In condition 1 the
outcomes for the two remaining unchosen options were presented. A
green tick or a red X appeared on the left of the two options that
were unchosen during the first decision-making phase, depending
on whether they were rewarded or unrewarded. The red prize bar
did not move. This event was followed by presentation of the next
trial. This condition was critical because it enabled us to isolate
activity during the first decision-making and feedback phases
uncontaminated by activity related to a second decision. In condi-
tions 2 and 3, participants had the opportunity to choose between
the two remaining options that were unselected by the participant
at the first decision. These two remaining stimuli maintained their
spatial locations on the screen. In condition 2, the option reward
probabilities and points associated with the two options remained
identical to what they were at the first decision (Figure 2A). The
purpose of this condition was to use the participants’ responses at
the time of the second decision to improve our ability to rank the
two unchosen options at the time of the first decision on the basis
of expected value. However, in condition 3 only the reward proba-
bilities remained the same; the points for both remaining options
were changed to 50 (Figure 2A). Therefore, the only information
guiding participant decisions in condition 3 should theoretically be
the reward probabilities. This condition was introduced to more
accurately rank the two unchosen options at the first decision on
the basis of reward probability. For both conditions 2 and 3,
participants indicated their choice after a yellow question mark
appeared. This was followed by simultaneous feedback for the
chosen and unchosen options from the second decision. During
this second feedback phase, a red rectangle framed the selected
option and a green tick or red X was presented to the left of the
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were rewarded or unrewarded. If the choice at the second decision
was rewarded, the red prize bar updated in proportion to the
number of points won. This event was followed by presentation of
the next trial. There was no inter-trial interval in any condition.
Each event was jittered between 2.5 and 5.5 s (uniform distri-
bution). There were 60 trials in each condition, making 180 trials
in total. Conditions were pseudorandomly interleaved and were
uncued. Participants earned between £20 and £28 on the task,
depending on their performance.
The true reward probabilities associated with each stimulus type
varied independently from one trial to the next over the course of
the experiment at a rate determined by the volatility, which was
fixed in the current experiment. More specifically, the true reward
probability of each stimulus was drawn independently from a beta
distribution with a fixed variance and a mean that was determined
by the true reward probability of that stimulus on the preceding
trial. The true reward probabilities that participants tracked are
shown in Figure S3.
FMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
FMRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens TRIO scanner with
a voxel resolution of 36363m m
3, TR=3 s, TE=30 ms, Flip
angle=87u. The slice angle was set to 15u and a local z-shim was
applied around the orbitofrontal cortex to minimize signal dropout
in this region [54], which has previously been implicated in other
aspects of decision making. The mean number of volumes acquired
was 999, giving a mean total experiment time of approximately
50 min (see Text S1, Experimental Procedures for further details).
A general linear model (GLM) was fit in pre-whitened data
space [55]. Twenty-four regressors were included in the GLM (see
Table S1 for a summary): the main effect of the first decision-
making phase; the main effect of the first feedback phase; the main
effect of the foregone outcome phase (condition 1); the main effect
of the second decision-making phase (conditions 2 and 3); the main
effect of the second feedback phase (conditions 2 and 3); the
interaction between chosen probability and the first decision-
making phase; the interaction between chosen probability and the
first feedback phase; the interaction between the best unchosen
probability as determined by the model in conditions 1 and 2 and
the first decision-making phase; the interaction between the best
unchosen probability as determined by participant choices in
condition 3 and the first decision-making phase; the interaction
between the best unchosen probability as determined by the model
in conditions 1 and 2 and the first feedback phase; the interaction
between the best unchosen probability as determined by parti-
cipant choices in condition 3 and the first feedback phase; the
interaction between the worst unchosen probability as determined
by the model in conditions 1 and 2 and the first decision-making
phase; the interaction between the worst unchosen probability as
determined by participant choices in condition 3 and the first
decision-making phase; the interaction between the worst unchosen
probability as determined by the model in conditions 1 and 2 and
the first feedback phase; the interaction between the worst unchosen
probability as determined by participant choices in condition 3 and
the first feedback phase; the outcome at the first feedback phase; the
outcome at the second feedback phase; and six motion regressors
produced during realignment. Because there were not any notable
differences between z-statistic maps based on the model or parti-
cipant choices, we defined contrasts of parameter estimates (COPEs)
for the best and worst unchosen probability as the combination of
the regressors based on the model and participant choices. Based on
the evidence from our previous investigation [8] that the lFPC
encodes reward probability during both the decision and feedback
phases, the reward probability regressors were modeled across
both phases. To do so, additional COPEs defined the chosen, best
unchosen, and worst unchosen probabilities as the sum of regressors
over the first decision-making and feedback phases (Table S1).
For group analyses, EPI images were first registered to the high
resolution structural image using 7 degrees of freedom and then
to the standard [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)] space
MNI152 template using affine registration with 12 degrees of
freedom [56]. We then fit a GLM to estimate the group mean
effects for the regressors described above. FMRIB’s Local
Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME) was used to perform a mixed
effects group analysis [57,58]. All reported fMRI z-statistics and
p-values arose from these mixed effects analyses on all 19
participants. We report clusters of greater than 10 voxels that
survived a threshold of z.3.1, p,0.001, uncorrected. It should
be noted that our analyses carefully avoid selection bias in
identifying regions related to probability. Based on the findings of
our previous study and other investigations [8,45,46], we were
confident that lFPC would encode the relative probability rather
than either chosen or unchosen probability in isolation. One of the
central aims of this experiment, however, was to test the hypothesis
that the lFPC encoded the best unchosen probability and either the
chosen probability, worst unchosen probability, or both (see
Figure 1). For the probability-based analysis, rather than search
for regions encoding the relative unchosen probability (e.g., the best
unchosen probability relative to the chosen probability or the best
unchosen probability relative to the average of the other
probabilities), for which there are large effects in the lFPC (see
Figure S1), we have searched only for regions that encode the best
unchosen probability. We have used this analysis because it is
orthogonal to the worst unchosen and chosen probability regressors
and thus enables us to perform orthogonal tests on the regions of
interest (ROIs) identified to test competing hypotheses. ROI
analyses are presented in detail in Text S1, Experimental
Procedures.
Behavioral Model
We used an optimal Bayesian reinforcement-learning algorithm
[13] to model participant estimates of the reward probabilities and
their eventual choices. This model has been described in detail in
previous investigations [8,13,15]. Briefly, the model is composed of
a ‘‘predictor’’ that estimates the reward probability associated with
each option and other environmental statistics given only the
observed data (i.e., the reward outcomes of chosen and unchosen
options) and a ‘‘selector’’ that chooses actions on the basis of these
estimates. Because feedback is given on each option on each trial
in our experimental task, the model updates the reward probability
associated with each option upon receipt of feedback, as is optimal.
These estimates of the reward probabilities were then combined
with reward magnitude according to participant-specific free para-
meters that can differentially weigh probability, magnitude, and
their product, to derive estimates of the subjective expected values.
We found no evidence that participants’ choices at the first de-
cision were influenced by the prospect of a second decision at which
reward magnitudes could either remain the same or both change to
50 (Text S1). We therefore assumed that subjective value at both
decisions was computed on the basis of the current decision alone:
gsi~brsizlmsizcrsimsi, ð1Þ
where gsi, rsi,a n dmsi are the subjective value, reward probability,
and reward magnitude associated with the stimulus (face, house, or
body) on trial i. We fitted b, l,a n dc to each individual participant’s
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implemented in Matlab 7 (Mathworks). Finally, the selector assumed








total numberof stimulito choosebetween(Ns=3atthe first decision,
Ns=2 at the second decision).
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Relative unchosen probability. (A) Axial and coronal
slices through z-statistic maps relating to the effect of the best
unchosen reward probability minus the chosen reward probability.
Activations are displayed at z.3.1, p,0.001, uncorrected, though
left lFPC survives whole brain cluster correction at z.2.3, p,0.05.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Chosen reward prediction errors. (A) Axial slice
through z-statistic map relating to the conjunction of the effects of
chosen prediction error at decisions 1 and 2. Activations are displayed
at z.3.1, p,0.01, cluster-corrected at the whole brain level. (B)
Time course from an ROI centered on the maximum of left ventral
striatum showing a positive correlation with outcome (reward or no
reward) and a negative correlation with chosen reward probability
in response to presentation of feedback on the chosen option.
(TIF)
Figure S3 True reward probabilities. The true reward proba-
bility that generated actual rewards is shown for faces, bodies, and
houses in cyan, pink, and purple, respectively.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Comparison of actual choice frequencies and model-
based choice probabilities. Top row: Group mean 6 SEM for
choices of the best option is plotted against the optimal choice
probability as predicted by the Bayesian model for decisions 1 (left)
and 2 (right). Bottom row: Group mean 6 SEM for choices of the
second best option is plotted against the model-based probability
of choosing the second best option for decisions 1 (left) and 2
(right). Participants chose between three options at decision 1 and
two options at decision 2.
(TIF)
Table S1 Summary of interactions and contrasts included in the
design matrix.
(DOC)
Table S2 Activated clusters resulting from the whole-brain
analysis, for the interactions of interest.
(DOC)
Text S1 Supplemental data and supplemental experimental pro-
cedures provide further detailsof the experimental task and analyses.
(DOC)
Acknowledgments
We thank Rogier Mars for help with scanning and technical assistance and
Mark Walton, Laurence Hunt, and Jill O’Reilly for helpful discussions.
Author Contributions
The author(s) have made the following declarations about their
contributions: Conceived and designed the experiments: EDB TEB MFR.
Performed the experiments: EDB. Analyzed the data: EDB TEB MFR.
Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: EDB TEB. Wrote the paper:
EDB MFR.
References
1. Rangel A, Camerer C, Montague PR (2008) A framework for studying
the neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nat Rev Neurosci 9:
545–556.
2. Rushworth MF, Behrens TE (2008) Choice, uncertainty and value in prefrontal
and cingulate cortex. Nat Neurosci 11: 389–397.
3. Seo H, Lee D (2008) Cortical mechanisms for reinforcement learning in
competitive games. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 363: 3845–3857.
4. Schoenbaum G, Roesch MR, Stalnaker TA, Takahashi YK (2009) A new
perspective on the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in adaptive behaviour. Nat Rev
Neurosci 10: 885–892.
5. Kable JW, Glimcher PW (2009) The neurobiology of decision: consensus and
controversy. Neuron 63: 733–745.
6. Sutton RS, Barto AG (1998) Reinforcement learning: an introduction MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
7. Tobler PN, Fiorillo CD, Schultz W (2005) Adaptive coding of reward value by
dopamine neurons. Science 307: 1642–1645.
8. Boorman ED, Behrens TE, Woolrich MW, Rushworth MF (2009) How green is
the grass on the other side? Frontopolar cortex and the evidence in favor of
alternative courses of action. Neuron 62: 733–743.
9. Koechlin E, Hyafil A (2007) Anterior prefrontal function and the limits of
human decision-making. Science 318: 594–598.
10. Charron S, Koechlin E (2010) Divided representation of concurrent goals in the
human frontal lobes. Science 328: 360–363.
11. Lohrenz T, McCabe K, Camerer CF, Montague PR (2007) Neural signature of
fictive learning signals in a sequential investment task. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
104: 9493–9498.
12. Hayden BY, Pearson JM, Platt ML (2009) Fictive reward signals in the anterior
cingulate cortex. Science 324: 948–950.
13. Behrens TE, Woolrich MW, Walton ME, Rushworth MF (2007) Learning the
value of information in an uncertain world. Nat Neurosci 10: 1214–1221.
14. Camerer CF, Ho T (1999) Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning in
normal-form games. Econometrica 67: 827–874.
15. Behrens TE, Hunt LT, Woolrich MW, Rushworth MF (2008) Associative
learning of social value. Nature 456: 245–249.
16. Behrens TE, Hunt LT, Rushworth MF (2009) The computation of social
behavior. Science 324: 1160–1164.
17. Rushworth MF, Mars RB, Summerfield C (2009) General mechanisms for
making decisions? Curr Opin Neurobiol 19: 75–83.
18. Summerfield C, Koechlin E (2008) A neural representation of prior information
during perceptual inference. Neuron 59: 336–347.
19. Summerfield C, Trittschuh EH, Monti JM, Mesulam MM, Egner T (2008)
Neural repetition suppression reflects fulfilled perceptual expectations. Nat
Neurosci.
20. den Ouden HE, Friston KJ, Daw ND, McIntosh AR, Stephan KE (2009) A dual
role for prediction error in associative learning. Cereb Cortex 19: 1175–1185.
21. Hampton AN, Bossaerts P, O’Doherty JP (2008) Neural correlates of
mentalizing-related computations during strategic interactions in humans. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A 105: 6741–6746.
22. den Ouden HEM, Daunizeau J, Roiser J, Daw NN, Friston KJ, et al. (2009)
Striatal prediction error activity drives cortical connectivity changes during
associative learning. Hum Brain Mapp Abstracts.
23. Schultz W, Dayan P, Montague PR (1997) A neural substrate of prediction and
reward. Science 275: 1593–1599.
24. Camille N, Coricelli G, Sallet J, Pradat-Diehl P, Duhamel JR, et al. (2004) The
involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in the experience of regret. Science 304:
1167–1170.
25. Coricelli G, Critchley HD, Joffily M, O’Doherty JP, Sirigu A, et al. (2005)
Regret and its avoidance: a neuroimaging study of choice behavior. Nat
Neurosci 8: 1255–1262.
26. Rangel A, Hare T (2010) Neural computations associated with goal-directed
choice. Curr Opin Neurobiol 20: 262–270.
27. Koechlin E, Basso G, Pietrini P, Panzer S, Grafman J (1999) The role of the
anterior prefrontal cortex in human cognition. Nature 399: 148–151.
28. Sakai K, Rowe JB, Passingham RE (2002) Active maintenance in prefrontal area
46 creates distractor-resistant memory. Nat Neurosci 5: 479–484.
29. Sakai K, Passingham RE (2006) Prefrontal set activity predicts rule-specific
neural processing during subsequent cognitive performance. J Neurosci 26:
1211–1218.
30. Burgess PW, Scott SK, Frith CD (2003) The role of the rostral frontal cortex
(area 10) in prospective memory: a lateral versus medial dissociation.
Neuropsychologia 41: 906–918.
Counterfactual Choice and Learning in FPC
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 12 June 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e100109331. Ramnani N, Owen AM (2004) Anterior prefrontal cortex: insights into function
from anatomy and neuroimaging. Nat Rev Neurosci 5: 184–194.
32. Simons JS, Scholvinck ML, Gilbert SJ, Frith CD, Burgess PW (2006) Differential
components of prospective memory? Evidence from fMRI. Neuropsychologia
44: 1388–1397.
33. Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD (2008) Unconscious determinants of
free decisions in the human brain. Nat Neurosci 11: 543–545.
34. Rowe JB, Sakai K, Lund TE, Ramsoy T, Christensen MS, et al. (2007) Is the
prefrontal cortex necessary for establishing cognitive sets? J Neurosci 27:
13303–13310.
35. Tsujimoto S, Genovesio A, Wise SP (2010) Evaluating self-generated decisions in
frontal pole cortex of monkeys. Nat Neurosci 13: 120–126.
36. Koechlin E, Corrado G, Pietrini P, Grafman J (2000) Dissociating the role of the
medial and lateral anterior prefrontal cortex in human planning. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 97: 7651–7656.
37. Koechlin E (2008) The cognitive architecture of human lateral prefrontal cortex.
In: Haggard P, Rossetti Y, Kawato M, eds. Sensorimotor foundations of higher
cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp 483–509.
38. Parvizi J, Van Hoesen GW, Buckwalter J, Damasio A (2006) Neural connections
of the posteromedial cortex in the macaque. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103:
1563–1568.
39. Beckmann M, Johansen-Berg H, Rushworth MF (2009) Connectivity-based
parcellation of human cingulate cortex and its relation to functional
specialization. J Neurosci 29: 1175–1190.
40. Petrides M, Pandya DN (2007) Efferent association pathways from the rostral
prefrontal cortex in the macaque monkey. J Neurosci 27: 11573–11586.
41. Pearson JM, Hayden BY, Raghavachari S, Platt ML (2009) Neurons in posterior
cingulate cortex signal exploratory decisions in a dynamic multioption choice
task. Curr Biol 19: 1532–1537.
42. Rushworth MF, Croxson PL, Buckley MJ, Walton ME (2008) Ventrolateral and
medial frontal contributions to decision-making and action selection. In:
Bunge SA, Wallis JD, eds. Neuroscience of rule-guided behavior. New York:
Oxford University Press. pp 129–158.
43. Jubault T, Ody C, Koechlin E (2007) Serial organization of human behavior in
the inferior parietal cortex. J Neurosci 27: 11028–11036.
44. Glascher J, Hampton AN, O’Doherty JP (2009) Determining a role for
ventromedial prefrontal cortex in encoding action-based value signals during
reward-related decision making. Cereb Cortex 19: 483–495.
45. FitzGerald TH, Seymour B, Dolan RJ (2009) The role of human orbitofrontal
cortex in value comparison for incommensurable objects. J Neurosci 29:
8388–8395.
46. Daw ND, O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Seymour B, Dolan RJ (2006) Cortical
substrates for exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441: 876–879.
47. Hampton AN, Bossaerts P, O’Doherty JP (2006) The role of the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex in abstract state-based inference during decision making in
humans. J Neurosci 26: 8360–8367.
48. Chiu PH, Lohrenz TM, Montague PR (2008) Smokers’ brains compute, but
ignore, a fictive error signal in a sequential investment task. Nat Neurosci 11:
514–520.
49. Bates JF, Goldman-Rakic PS (1993) Prefrontal connections of medial motor
areas in the rhesus monkey. J Comp Neurol 336: 211–228.
50. Friston K (2005) A theory of cortical responses. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol
Sci 360: 815–836.
51. Seymour B, McClure SM (2008) Anchors, scales and the relative coding of value
in the brain. Curr Opin Neurobiol 18: 173–178.
52. Amodio DM, Frith CD (2006) Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and
social cognition. Nat Rev Neurosci 7: 268–277.
53. Saxe R (2006) Uniquely human social cognition. Curr Opin Neurobiol 16:
235–239.
54. Deichmann R, Gottfried JA, Hutton C, Turner R (2003) Optimized EPI for
fMRI studies of the orbitofrontal cortex. Neuroimage 19: 430–441.
55. Woolrich MW, Ripley BD, Brady M, Smith SM (2001) Temporal autocorre-
lation in univariate linear modeling of FMRI data. Neuroimage 14: 1370–1386.
56. Jenkinson M, Smith S (2001) A global optimisation method for robust affine
registration of brain images. Med Image Anal 5: 143–156.
57. Beckmann CF, Jenkinson M, Smith SM (2003) General multilevel linear
modeling for group analysis in FMRI. Neuroimage 20: 1052–1063.
58. Woolrich MW, Behrens TE, Beckmann CF, Jenkinson M, Smith SM (2004)
Multilevel linear modelling for FMRI group analysis using Bayesian inference.
Neuroimage 21: 1732–1747.
Counterfactual Choice and Learning in FPC
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 13 June 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e1001093